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may be the practical result of these decisions. Assuming arguendo a
slight harm to adults arising from reading this material, such possible
harm should not operate to limit constitutional guarantees of free
speech and press. In Jacobellis, the Court suggested that it might be
better for legislative bodies to control dissemination of offensive material to children rather than entirely suppressing it.49 The Court
might accept its own advice. An extension of the first and fourteenth
amendments to include material now considered obscene would relieve
the Court of "[T]he irksome and inevitably unpopular and unwholesome task of finally deciding [obscenity cases] by a case-by-case, sightby-sight personal judgment of the members of... [the] Court." 50
JAMES CRABTmE
DANIEL KEARNEY

IMPLIED WARRANTY: STRICT LIABILITY OF THE
MANUFACTURER IN ABSENCE OF PRIVITY
FOR ALL PRODUCTS
Lily-Tulip Cup Corp. v. Bernstein, 181 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1965)
Plaintiff, a hospital patient, was scalded by hot liquid when a
paper cup came apart. She brought an action against the manufacturer of the cup on the theories of negligence and implied warranty. At a pretrial conference, plaintiff conceded that she was unable to prove negligence, and the trial court dismissed the implied
warranty count on the ground that privity was necessary to sustain
the action. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court.' On certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, HELD, "privity
is not essential to a cause of action by a consumer against the manufacturer where the product is neither a foodstuff nor a dangerous
instrumentality."
49. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
50. Mishdn v. New York, 86 S. Ct. 958, 968 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
1.

177 So. 2d 362 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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The privity issue is raised by the fact that breach of implied warranty is a curious hybrid between tort law and sales law. Though the
action was originally tort in nature, 2 it proceeds ex contractu.3 Therefore, the courts have held that there must be privity of contract between the parties before suit can be instituted.4 The law, however,
is well settled in Florida that privity is not required where the product
is either a foodstuff5 or a dangerous instrumentality.6 Since implied
warranty is a form of strict liability, the supplier of such products have
been the absolute insurers of damages arising from their defects. The
7
plaintiff need not show negligence on the part of the manufacturer;
it is sufficient to show he used the product and was injured as a
result of some defect. The courts have held that public policy dictates that the manufacturer of such products be strictly liable for
their use and have not allowed them to assert lack of privity as a
defense., Unlike foodstuffs and dangerous instrumentalities, ordinary
products have not had the compelling public policy reasons for dispensing with the privity requirement. 9 Therefore, if a consumer not
in privity with the manufacturer wanted to recover he had to proceed on the basis of negligence. This requirement precluded recovery
in many cases because the plaintiff, as in the case of Mrs. Bernstein,
was unable to prove negligence.
Prior to Bernstein, whether privity was necessary for an action on
breach of implied warranty for products neither foodstuff nor dangerous instrumentality was far from clear. In Hoskins v. Jackson Grain
Co.,10 a 1953 case, the Florida Supreme Court announced that it had
"become aligned with those courts holding that suit may be brought
against the manufacturer notwithstanding want of privity." The case,
however, was for damages resulting from mislabeled seeds, which, as
the court noted, are not clearly outside the foodstuff category.
Therefore, the only certainty about the case was that the court had
extended the foodstuff category to include seeds. Similarly, the court
seemed willing to extend the dangerous instrumentality category in
2. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv.
117 (1943).
3. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81
(1963).
4. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
5. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963); Blanton v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
6. King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., 159 So. 2d 108 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
7. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
8. Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952).
9. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
10.

63 So. 2d 514 (1953), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 75 So. 2d 306

(Fla. 1954).
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Matthews v. Lawnlite Co.31 The plaintiff in Matthews had his finger
severed as he was testing one of the defendant's folding aluminum
chairs on display in a store. In an action against the manufacturer,
the supreme court noted that the chair was not a dangerous instrumentality of the nature of guns and automobiles. Yet, the court allowed the plaintiff to recover in absence of privity because the moving
parts of the chair were "inherently dangerous" and that one "is not
required to guard against danger in places where it is not expected
to be."12
The Third District Court of Appeal was the first to decide that
privity is not required to sustain an action where the product is
clearly neither a foodstuff nor a dangerous instrument. In Continental Copper & Steel Industries,Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius,Inc.,3
the court permitted recovery on implied warranty where the manufacturer had supplied the consumer with defective electrical cable.
Citing Hoskins and Matthews, the court held that a lack of privity
was no bar to recovery. Since electrical cable is not within the two
categorids, which have previously given rise to strict liability, the court
may have created a third all-encompassing category - all other products. This was not certain, however, for two reasons. First, the
authorities for the decision were Matthews and Hoskins, neither of
which involved products that were clearly outside the foodstuff and
dangerous instrumentality categories. Second, the opinion did not
indicate whether the court intended to dismiss privity as a requirement in all suits against the manufacturer. 4 Thus, in 1958, the
Florida law of implied warranty appeared to be: Privity was not
required in cases involving foodstuffs, dangerous instrumentalities,
and some other products.
The Bernstein decision has ended any conflict over the necessity
of privity in an action by the consumer against the manufacturer
on breach of implied warranty. The supreme court has, in effect,
held that privity is no longer a part of the law of implied warranty.
The significance of the decision is hard to overemphasize. Since implied warranty is strict liability, any consumer who is damaged by
a defect in a product will have a cause of action against the manufacturer of that product. Presumably the liability of the manufacturer would cover both property damage as in Continental and personal injury as in Bernstein. Since Mrs. Bernstein did not purchase
the defendant's cup, the decision also seems to indicate that regardless
how the product came into the hands of the user, the manufacturer
11. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
12. Id. at 301.
13. 104 So. 2d 40 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
14. For a complete discussion see Note, Sales-Implied Warranty - Privity
Unnecessary, 13 U. Mui~
L. REv. 252 (1958).
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may still be liable. It is not necessary for a sale to be involved for
implied warranty to apply. Thus, the manufacturer may also be liable
to any third party, who is a stranger.
Absolute strict liability would, of course, be extremely harsh on
manufacturers; thus, it seems likely that some limitations will be
placed upon the doctrine. One such limitation was allowed by the
Second District Court of Appeal in a case involving impure blood.15
The court held the defendant would be liable on implied warranty
unless he could show that the blood was "unavoidably unsafe."
Similarly, other extenuating circumstances such as contributory negligence of the plaintiff or misuse of the product might affect the manufacturer's liability. Regardless of what defenses become available to
the manufacturer, the practical effect of Bernstein is that the burden
of proof has been shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant. The
manufacturer of defective products will be strictly liable unless he
can show circumstances that would warrant a limitation on the implied warranty doctrine.
Although Bernstein is concerned with the liability of manufacturers, it is interesting to note that the liability of retailers for breach
of implied warranty has also been largely settled. In Foley v. Weaver
Drugs, Inc.,16 a woman cut her wrist as she attempted to open a bottle
of pills purchased from the defendant. The supreme court denied
recovery based on breach of implied warranty even though there
was privity between the parties, reasoning that public policy did not
dictate that strict liability be extended to cover containers that held
foodstuff. It seems to follow that the retailer will be strictly liable
only for foodstuffs, and possibly dangerous instrumentalities, even
when privity exists between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The Florida courts have thus made privity insignificant in an
action against either the retailer or the manufacturer for damages
caused by defects in the product they sell. As a result of Bernstein,
the manufacturer will be strictly liable for all products regardless of
privity. On the other hand, Foley indicates that the retailer will be
strictly liable only if the product is a foodstuff or, perhaps, a dangerous
instrumentality even if there is privity.
By holding the manufacturer strictly liable in absence of privity
and regardless of the product, Florida has catapulted to the lead in
the national trend. Most jurisdictions do not require privity where
the product is a foodstuff, 17 but there are cases to the contrary.' 8
15.

Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1966).
16. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
17. E.g., Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d
1094 (1957); Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1959).
18. E.g., Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930);
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